


Bug Bounty Bootcamp


The Guide to Finding and Reporting Web Vulnerabilities

by Vickie Li

errata updated to print 3

Page	Error	Correction	Print corrected
xvi	Mechanisms Cooking Sharing	Mechanisms Cookie Sharing	Print 2
35	Figure update	 <p>The diagram illustrates the process of a browser requesting a website. It shows three main components: 'Your browser', 'DNS server', and 'Web server 216.58.192.132'. The flow is as follows: 1. 'Your browser' sends a request 'Hey, where is www.google.com?' to the 'DNS server'. 2. The 'DNS server' responds 'It's at 216.58.192.132.' back to 'Your browser'. 3. 'Your browser' then sends a request 'Give me Google, please.' to the 'Web server'. 4. The 'Web server' responds 'Yeah, sure. Here you go!' back to 'Your browser'.</p>	Print 2
42	<pre>{ "alg" : "none", "typ" : "JWT" } { "user" : "admin" }</pre>	<pre>{ "alg" : "none", "typ" : "JWT" } { "user_name" : "admin" }</pre>	Print 2
135	<pre>inurl:redirecturi site:example.com inurl:redirect_uri site:example.com inurl:redirecturl site:example.com inurl:redirect_uri site:example.com</pre>	<pre>inurl:redirecturi site:example.com inurl:redirect_uri site:example.com inurl:redirecturl site:example.com inurl:redirect_url site:example.com</pre>	Print 2

Page	Error	Correction	Print corrected
166	<pre data-bbox="176 186 1014 527">def validate_token(): ❶ if (request.csrf_token == session.csrf_token): pass else: ❷ throw_error("CSRF token incorrect. Request rejected.") [...]</pre> <pre data-bbox="176 407 558 516">def process_state_changing_action(): if request.csrf_token: validate_token() ❸ execute_action()</pre> <p data-bbox="176 548 1014 654">This fragment of Python code first checks whether the CSRF token exists ❶. If it exists, the code will proceed to validate the token. If the token is valid, the code will continue. If the token is invalid, the code will stop the execution and produce an error ❷.</p>	<pre data-bbox="1052 186 1885 527">def validate_token(): if (request.csrf_token == session.csrf_token): pass else: ❶ throw_error("CSRF token incorrect. Request rejected.") [...]</pre> <pre data-bbox="1052 407 1430 516">def process_state_changing_action(): ❷ if request.csrf_token: validate_token() ❸ execute_action()</pre> <p data-bbox="1041 548 1885 654">This fragment of Python code first checks whether the CSRF token exists ❷. If it exists, the code will proceed to validate the token. If the token is valid, the code will continue. If the token is invalid, the code will stop the execution and produce an error ❶.</p>	Print 2
203	URL update	You can find it at https://github.com/digininja/DVWA/	Print 2
250	For example, a base64-encoded block of XML code tends to start with LD94bWw , which is the base64-encoded string of "<?xml".	For example, a base64-encoded block of XML code tends to start with PD94bWw , which is the base64-encoded string of "<?xml".	Pending
273	URL update	<ul data-bbox="1062 813 1797 841" style="list-style-type: none"> CTF Wiki, https://ctf-wiki.org/pwn/sandbox/pytbon/pytbon-sandbox-escape/ 	Print 2
297	<pre data-bbox="176 902 1014 946">Access-Control-Allow-Origin: b.example.com</pre> <p data-bbox="176 971 1014 1052">The application can also return the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header with a wildcard character (*) to indicate that the resource on that page can be accessed by any domain:</p> <pre data-bbox="176 1076 1014 1120">Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *</pre> <p data-bbox="176 1144 1014 1198">On the other hand, if the origin of the requesting page isn't allowed to access the resource, the user's browser will block the requesting page from reading the data.</p> <p data-bbox="176 1222 1014 1336">CORS is a great way to implement cross-origin communication. However, CORS is safe only when the list of allowed origins is properly defined. If CORS is misconfigured, attackers can exploit the misconfiguration and access the protected resources.</p> <p data-bbox="176 1360 1014 1490">The most basic misconfiguration of CORS involves allowing the null origin. If the server sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin to null, the browser will allow any site with a null origin header to access the resource. This isn't safe because any origin can create a request with a null origin. For instance, cross-site requests generated from a document using the data: URL scheme will have a null origin.</p>	<pre data-bbox="1052 902 1885 946">Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://b.example.com</pre> <p data-bbox="1041 971 1885 1052">The application can also return the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header with a wildcard character (*) to indicate that the resource on that page can be accessed by any origin:</p> <pre data-bbox="1052 1076 1885 1120">Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *</pre> <p data-bbox="1041 1144 1885 1198">On the other hand, if the origin of the requesting page isn't allowed to access the resource, the user's browser will block the requesting page from reading the data.</p> <p data-bbox="1041 1222 1885 1336">CORS is a great way to implement cross-origin communication. However, CORS is safe only when the list of allowed origins is properly defined. If CORS is misconfigured, attackers can exploit the misconfiguration and access the protected resources.</p> <p data-bbox="1041 1360 1885 1490">The most basic misconfiguration of CORS involves allowing the null origin. If the server sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin to null, the browser will allow any site with a null origin header to access the resource. This isn't safe because any origin can create a request with a null origin. For instance, cross-origin requests generated from a document using the data: URL scheme will have a null origin.</p>	Print 3

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298	<p>An interesting configuration that isn't exploitable is setting the allowed origins to the wildcard (*). This isn't exploitable because CORS doesn't allow credentials, including cookies, authentication headers, or client-side certificates, to be sent with requests to these pages. Since credentials cannot be sent in requests to these pages, no private information can be accessed:</p>	<p>An interesting configuration that isn't susceptible to information leak is setting the allowed origins to the wildcard (*). If a client sends a request with credentials to a page with a wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin header, the browser will raise an error and won't allow the client to read the response, so no private information can be accessed:</p>	Print 3
304	<p>If not, send a request to the site with the origin header <code>attacker.com</code>, and see if the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> in the response is set to <code>attacker.com</code>. (You can add an Origin header by intercepting the request and editing it in a proxy.)</p> <pre data-bbox="174 435 1018 483">Origin: attacker.com</pre> <p>Finally, test whether the site properly validates the origin URL by submitting an Origin header that contains an allowed site, such as <code>www.example.com.attacker.com</code>. See if the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> header returns the origin of the attacker's domain.</p> <pre data-bbox="174 609 1018 657">Origin: www.example.com.attacker.com</pre>	<p>If not, send a request to the site with the origin header <code>https://attacker.com</code>, and see if the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> in the response is set to <code>https://attacker.com</code>. (You can add an Origin header by intercepting the request and editing it in a proxy.)</p> <pre data-bbox="1045 435 1890 483">Origin: https://attacker.com</pre> <p>Finally, test whether the site properly validates the origin URL by submitting an Origin header that contains an allowed site, such as <code>https://www.example.com.attacker.com</code>. See if the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> header returns the origin of the attacker's domain.</p> <pre data-bbox="1045 646 1890 695">Origin: https://www.example.com.attacker.com</pre>	Print 3
304	Figure update	 <pre> graph TD Q1{Does the site use CORS?} -- Yes --> Q2{Does the site return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null?} Q1 -- No --> Q3{Does the site return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com if you send a request with Origin: https://attacker.com?} Q2 -- Yes --> R1[CORS misconfiguration] Q3 -- Yes --> R1 Q4{Does the site return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://www.example.com.attacker.com if you send a request with Origin: https://www.example.com.attacker.com?} -- Yes --> R1 </pre> <p>Figure 19-2: Is the site vulnerable to a CORS misconfiguration vulnerability?</p>	Print 3

Page	Error	Correction	Print corrected
308	Cooking Sharing	Cookie Sharing	Print 2